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CASE COMMENTS
orally.499 In such cases, the courts have found it is an abuse of discretion
not to provide the nonmoving party an opportunity for oral argument.
In contrast, the majority view, which allows a district court to dispose
of a motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing, appears to
arise out of an understanding that a court can "hear" a matter as well on
paper as it can through the process of oral argument.5s° Coakley & Williams
aligns the Fourth Circuit with the majority of the other circuits that have
addressed the question of whether a district court may grant a motion for
summary judgment without allowing the opposing party an opportunity for
an oral hearing. 01
K. HosPrrALs
Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America
977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992)
In 1985, as a portion of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).5 2 The purpose of this act was to prevent hospitals from engaging
499. See, e.g., Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that
because summary judgment motion disposes of action on merits with prejudice, district court
may not deny request for oral hearing of party opposing motion unless it denies motion); see
also Season-All Indus. Inc. v. Turkiye Sise Ve Cam Fabrikalari, 425 F.2d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 1970)
(expressing view that courts should not deny hearing on motion for summary judgment except
in very narrow circumstances because granting motion disposes of claim or defense with fmality).
500. See CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 411 (lst Cir.
1985) (noting five other circuits' holdings that reference in Rule 56(c) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to "hearing" does not necessarily imply oral argument); Hazen v. S. Hills Nat'l Bank,
414 F.2d 778, 780 (10th Cir. 1969) (stating that trial court does not abuse its- discretion by not
permitting oral argument if parties filed comprehensive briefs); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827,
828 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that because judgment entered was based on pleadings, motions,
affidavits, and exhaustive briefs, court did not abuse discretion in denying hearing); Skolnick v.
Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1963) (same), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908 (1964).
501. See CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 411 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding that trial court did not err in denying request for oral argument before rendering
summary judgment because briefs sufficiently set out legal arguments); Spark v. Catholic Univ.,
510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that court may dispense with oral argument on
motion for summary judgment in appropriate circumstances); Parish v. Howard, 459 F.2d 616,
620 (8th Cir. 1972) (same); Season-All Indus. Inc. v. Turkiye Sise Ve Cam Fabrikalari, 425 F.2d
34, 39 (3d Cir. 1970) (same); Hazen v. S. Hills Nat'l Bank, 414 F.2d 778, 780 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that when parties filed comprehensive briefs, court did not err in denying hearing before
ruling on motion for summary judgment); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1963)
(same), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908 (1964).
502. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1992). The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
states, in relevant parts, that "if any individual comes to the emergency department and a request
is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the
hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination... to determine whether
an emergency medical condition... exists." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). Additionally, if the hospital
determines that an emergency medical condition exists, the hospital must provide either "(A)
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in "patient dumping. ' ' 50 a This practice involves hospitals refusing to see, or
transferring to other institutions, patients who are unable to pay for their
medical services, even though the hospital possesses the necessary resources
to provide care.5 4
EMTALA specifically provides a private cause of action against hospitals
for violations of the act.505 The language of the act does not, however,
enumerate a private cause of action against a physician.5°6 Most courts have
thus interpreted EMTALA as not providing for any private cause of action
against individual physicians, and have refused to allow individuals to bring
such suits under the act.5 7
In Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America'0 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered three questions: (1) whether a
patient can bring a claim under EMTALA against individual physicians, and
if so whether appellant, as Administrator of the estate of Brenda Baber,
stated a claim able to withstand a motion for summary judgment; (2) whether
the appellant established a claim under EMTALA against the Appellee
hospitals sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment; and (3)
whether a claim under EMTALA against the parent corporations of the
hospitals was sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.
The material facts in Baber were essentially undisputed. On August 5,
1987, Brenda Baber entered the emergency room at Raleigh General Hospital
accompanied by her brother. She had ceased taking her antipsychosis med-
icine and had been drinking heavily. Ms. Baber was nauseous, agitated,
tremulous, suffered from disorderly thought patterns and felt that she might
within the. staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and
such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or (B) for the transfer of
the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section." 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). The Act's only exception to these requirements is if the patient refuses
treatment, or refuses transfer under subsection (c) of the act. Id. Enforcement of the act involves
civil money penalties and provides for administrative and monetary sanctions and for a private
cause of action:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospitals
violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the participating
hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the state
in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
503. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A)-(B). EMTALA also deals with the
treatment of women in active labor, but those provisions are irrelevant to this case.
504. See Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 873 n.1 (4th Cir. 1992); Melissa
K. Stull, Annotation, Construction and Application of Emergency Treatment and Active Labor
Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd), 104 A.L.R. FED. 166, 175 (1991).
505. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
506. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B). The language of the statute
allows enforcement of EMTALA against a physician only by the Department of Health and
Human Services.
507. See infra note 500 and accompanying text (citing cases from two jurisdictions that
support Fourth Circuit's interpretation of EMTALA as not providing private cause of action
against physician).
508. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
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be pregnant. The attending physician, Dr. Kline, examined Ms. Baber,
ordered several tests and administered medication to calm her.
Later, while roaming the emergency department, Ms. Baber suffered
from a convulsion and fell, striking her head upon a table and lacerating
her scalp. Dr. Kline examined her again, sutured the injury, and ordered a
blood gas test to check for oxygen deprivation and acidosis. Ms. Baber was
able to move her head, eyes and limbs without discomfort, and could speak.
Dr. Kline determined that Ms. Baber's anxiety, disorientation, restlessness
and speech problems were caused by pre-existing psychiatric problems and
alcohol withdrawal.
Dr. Kline then contacted Ms. Baber's psychiatrist of two years, Dr.
Whelan. Dr. Whelan opined that Ms. Baber was an undifferentiated schiz-
ophrenic and an alcohol abuser, and that her behavior at Raleigh General
Hospital was consistent with a relapse of her mental illness. Both doctors
agreed that she needed further treatment which could best be provided at
Beckley Appalachian Regional Hospital's psychiatric ward, where Ms. Baber
had been treated previously.
After her admittance to the Beckley psychiatric ward the staff put Ms.
Baber under restraint and checked her condition every fifteen minutes. Later
that morning Ms. Baber suffered a grand mal seizure. Upon the discovery
of this condition the staff transferred her to the emergency unit and per-
formed a computerized tomography scan which revealed a fractured skull
and a subdural hematoma. The staff then transferred Ms. Baber back to
Raleigh General Hospital for examination by a neurosurgeon. She was
comatose when she arrived at Raleigh General Hospital, and died later that
day.
Barry Baber brought suit against Dr. Kline, Raleigh General Hospital,
and the hospital's parent corporation, alleging that the defendants violated
EMTALA in three ways. First, he alleged that they violated the act by failing
to provide an "appropriate medical screening" to Ms. Baber as required
under EMTALA. Second, Mr. Baber charged that defendants violated the
act by failing to stabilize Ms. Baber's "emergency medical condition."
Finally, he alleged that Kline, Raleigh General hospital, and the parent
corporation violated EMTALA by transferring Ms. Baber to Beckley Ap-
palachian Regional Hospital without providing stabilizing treatment. Mr.
Baber also alleged that Dr. Whelan, Beckley Appalachian Regional Hospital,
and the parent corporation failed to provide Ms. Baber with "appropriate
medical screening" when she was admitted to Beckley Appalachian Regional
Hospital.
The district court found for the defendants on all counts and granted
summary judgment. The district court held that EMTALA did not grant
patients a private cause of action against their doctors. The district court
also held that the hospitals', and by implication their parent corporations',
conduct in treating Ms. Baber was not in violation of the act.
The United State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision on all counts. The Fourth Circuit first addressed the
question of whether a patient could bring an action against a physician under
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the act. Mr. Baber offered two cases as support for his proposition that the
court should allow a cause of action against individual physicians: Burditt
v. United States Department of Health and Human Services'09 and Sorrells
v. Babcock.5 10 The Fourth Circuit found both cases inapposite. Burditt
involved a physician's appeal of administrative sanctions imposed under the
act. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the fact that individual physicians
were subject to administrative sanctions did not imply a similar subjection
to private suits. The court therefore held that Burditt did not support a
cause of action against an individual doctor. The Sorrells case contained
district court dicta questioning whether Congress intended to allow a private
cause of action against physicians, while limiting the recovery of civil
monetary penalties to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The
Fourth Circuit refused to second guess congressional intent in this manner,
and instead chose to rely upon the language of the statute. The court
determined that no language in the statute provided for a private individual
to recover damages from a physician. Further, the court reasoned that the
legislative history of the act made clear a congressional intent to limit patient
suits to those against hospitals, reserving actions against individual physicians
to those brought by the Department of Health and Human Services."'
The Fourth Circuit next addressed appellant's claim against Raleigh
General Hospital. Mr. Baber made two general accusations: first, that the
hospital failed to provide an appropriate medical screening to determine that
Ms. Baber had an emergency medical condition; and second, that the hospital
transferred Ms. Baber before stabilizing her emergency medical condition
and had not completed the requisite paperwork to transfer a nonstable
patient.
In alleging that the hospital failed to provide an appropriate screening,
Baber contended that such a screening must satisfy a national standard of
care. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, and again relied on the language of the
statute which requires a medical screening that is "within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services routinely
available to the emergency department, to determine whether or not an
emergency medical condition ... exists. '95 12 The Fourth Circuit interpreted
the statute as requiring the hospital to develop a screening procedure to
identify critical conditions and to apply this procedure uniformly to all
509. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
510. 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
511. As support for its conclusion, the court cited the decisions of two other jurisdictions
that have also held that there is no private cause of action for damages against a physician under
EMTALA. See Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1991)
(holding that EMTALA provides cause of action by individual only against 'participating hospital,'
as there is no mention in statute of private cause of action against individual physicians); Delaney
v. Cade, 756 F. Supp. 1476, 1487 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding no private cause of action against
individual physicians under EMTALA, and relating that Congress knew how to create private
cause of action if it so desired).
512. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1992); see supra note 491 (giving text of statute).
CASE COMMENTS
patients with similar symptoms regardless of financial status. This standard,
the court noted, did not guarantee that the emergency personnel will correctly
diagnose all patients, and was not intended as a substitute for state law
medical malpractice claims. The Fourth Circuit held that the act is satisfied
so long as a standard screening procedure is applied uniformly to all patients
in similar medical circumstances. The court further found that the attention
given Ms. Baber at Raleigh General Hospital satisfied this standard. The
Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor
of Raleigh General Hospital.
As to Mr. Baber's claim that Raleigh General Hospital violated EMTALA
by improperly transferring Ms. Baber, the Fourth Circuit found Baber's
arguments to clearly contravene the language of the statute. Baber argued
that liability should be imposed on the hospital if it failed to provide
stabilizing treatment prior to a transfer when they knew or should have
known the patient was suffering from an emergency medical condition. The
court disagreed, interpreting the act to hold that under section 1395dd(c) in
order for the hospital to be liable, claimant must evidence that:
(1) the patient had an emergency medical condition; (2) the hospital
actually knew of that condition; (3) the patient was not stabilized
before being transferred; and (4) prior to transfer of the unstable
patient, the transferring hospital did not obtain the proper consent
or follow the appropriate certification and transfer procedures.
5 1 3
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Baber failed to provide any
proof of actual knowledge by the hospital of Ms. Baber's emergency medical
condition, and had therefore not established a claim under EMTALA for a
violation of this section of the act.
5 1 4
Mr. Baber's final claim was that Beckley Appalachian Regional Hospital
violated EMTALA by failing to perform an appropriate medical screening
when Ms. Baber was admitted to the psychiatric ward at that hospital. Once
again, the Fourth Circuit found that the language of the act did not support
Baber's contention. By its explicit language, section 1395dd(a) applies only
where the patient seeks treatment from the emergency department. Ms. Baber
was admitted directly to the psychiatric ward, and did not enter the emergency
department. The Fourth Circuit concluded from this that no facts supported
Mr. Baber's claim against Beckley Appalachian Regional Hospital.
513. Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir 1992).
514. See Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(finding that § 1395dd(b)(1) dictates standard of actual knowledge of emergency medical condition
by hospital for violation of EMTALA); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d
266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that hospital cannot be charged with violation for failing to
stabilize patient unless patient's emergency condition is detected); Thornton v. Southwest Detroit
Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring treatment once patient found to have
emergency medical condition); Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical Mgt., Inc., 771 F.
Supp. 343, 346 (E.D. Okla. 1991) (holding that provisions in act regarding stabilization apply
only when emergency condition is discovered).
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